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THE CONCEPT OF BENEFIT IN THE LAW
OF QUASI-CONTRACT
TIMOTHY J. SuLLIVAN*
INTRODUCTION

The appeal of a legal rule requiring the disgorgement of gains
unjustly acquired or retained is so compelling that scholars from
classical times to our own era may be cited in its support. 1 The
enthusiasm for separating a wrongdoer from his illicit gains, however,
has obscured careful analysis of what constitutes an unjust benefit
sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to recover in quasi-contract on
restitutionary principles.2 Not only do we lack a comprehensive
concept of benefit, but the need to develop uniform yardsticks for
measuring the quantum of gains unjustly obtained also has been
neglected.
The central function of quasi-contract in providing a remedy in
extremis may explain why no wholly consistent or comprehensive
definition of benefit is possible or even desirable. 3 Quasi-contract fills
many gaps in areas to which other more conventional legal actions do
not comfortably extend4 and often provides a remedy of last resort. To
serve these objectives the application of quasi-contract necessarily must
be improvisational. In failing to recognize that a doctrine serving such
divergent and exigent purposes is not likely to emerge as a model of
rationality, courts and scholars often have confused the concept of
*Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of Williani and
Mary; A.B., William & Mary, 1966; J.D., Harvard University, 1969. The author wishes to
acknowledge the generous assistance of his colleague, Professor Elmer J. Schaefer, and his
research assistant, Mr. Marc Kane, J.D., 1975, William and Mary.
1. See J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 3 (1951) (authorities cited as various as Pomponius, a second century Roman lawyer, and the Restatement ofRestitution).
2. See Comment, Quasi-Contracts-Concept of Benefit, 46 MICH. L. REV. 543, 544
(1948). Relatively few articles or student comments have treated the concept of benefit as
a distinct topic of general application. See generally Jeanblanc, Restitution under the
Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes a Legal Benefit, 26 IND. L.J. 1 (1950); Note, The
Necessity of Conferring a Benefit For Recovery in Quasi-Contract, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1259
(1968).
3. See J. DAWSON, supra note 1, at 7.
4. See Comment, supra note 2, at 551, 553-54.
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quasi-contract. A more reasonable analysis of quasi-contract suggests
that the doctrine simply cannot be systemized.
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS oF QuASI-CoNTRACT

Quasi-contract 5 grew out of the common law action of general
assumpsit, which itself was the progeny of the contract action of special
assumpsit. 6 Prior to the development of assumpsit, the personal actions
of covenant and debt were the principal means of enforcing contractual
obligations. 7 The action of covenant was never used widely in the
King's courts.8 Debt was a much more common device for the
enforcement of promises, although recovery in that action did not
hinge on a showing of mutual promises; indeed, a defendant would be
found liable in debt not because he had made a promise and failed to
perform but because he had received a benefit and had not given the
agreed value in return. 9
Since procedural limitations plagued the actions of covenant and
debt, 10 lawyers sought alternative forms of action for claims that
modern legal minds would denominate contractual. The King's courts
showed little interest in expanding the enforceability of promises
through liberation of these strict procedural rules, and plaintiffs'
lawyers turned to the action of trespass on the case as a more fruitful

5. Quasi-contract historically is a term limited in application to legal actions for therecovery of money. Modem usage has expanded the meaning of quasi-contract to include a
wide range of restitutionary actions both at law and in equity; this modem usage has been
criticized, however, as misleading and historically inaccurate. See Henderson, Promises
Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA. L.
REv. 1115, 1135 n.88 (1971). See generally Comment, Restitution: Concepts and
Tenns, 19 HASTINGS L.J.1167 ( 1968 ).
6. See J. DAWSON & R. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 1 (1969). The genesis and
maturation of quasi-contract is rooted firmly in English legal history. A detailed analysis
of the complicated and uncertain history of quasi-contract is beyond the scope of this ar·
ticle; other sources adequately discuss that history. See generally J. DAWSON, supra
note I; R. GoFF & G. JoNES, RESTITUTION (1966); R. JACKSON, THE HISTORY OF QuASI-CoN·
TRACT IN ENGLISH LAw (1936); W. KEENER, THE LAW OF QuASI-CoNTRACTS (1893); P.
WINFIELD, QUASI-CoNTRACTS (1952).
7. SeeS. MILSON, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CoMMON LAW 60·61 (1969). The
actions of covenant and debt were called personal actions because they were purely private
and of no interest to the King. To say that these actions were contractual is to impose the
logic and classifications of our time upon a much different legal system. See id. at 211-17.
8. See id. at 215.
9. See id. at 224.
10. Defects in the action of debt from the plaintiff's point of view included the defen·
dant's right to wage his law, the requirement that the amount in issue be a sum certain,
and the extraordinary difficulty of pleading in debt. See T. PLucKNETT, A CoNCISE
HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAW 565·66 ( 1936).
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alternative. Early lawyers clearly understood that a breach of a parol
promise was a tort, 11 but only gradually did they perceive actions in
trespass as at least partly contractual. 12 The development of the
contractual aspects of trespass focused attention on assumpsit, which
had its origin in trespass. .AF. actions in assumpsit became more
common, efforts were made to make assumpsit applicable to all cases of
simple contract to which debt applied. 13
The first step in the development of assumpsit as a functional
substitute for debt was the recognition "that a preexisting debt
constituted a consideration for a promise, and therefore, if one who
was already under an obligation enforceable by an action of debt made
a promise to pay the debt, such action was enforceable by an action of
assumpsit.m 4 Thus, if a plaintiff could show a second promise to pay,
subsequent to the creation of the obligation sought to be enforced, his
action in assumpsit would be free of the disabling procedural
impediments of debt. The decision in Slade's Case, 15 that the second
express promise need not be shown, 16 represented the next step. The
action created by that decision, indebitatus assumpsit or special
assumpsit, became a remedy substantially equivalent to debt. 17
The final step in the development of quasi-contract as a relatively
distinct legal doctrine can be traced to the opinion of Lord Mansfield in
Moses v. Macferlan, 18 a case involving an action in indebitatus
assumpsit. The plaintiff in Moses had endorsed notes of a third party
over to defendant upon defendant's promise that no action would be
commenced against the plaintiff on his endorsement. The defendant
breached that promise, sued the plaintiff in a separate action, and
recovered judgment. The plaintiff paid the judgment but brought an
action against the defendant in special assumpsit. 19 In awarding

11. See Ames, TheHistoryofAssumpsit:Parti, 2HARv.L.REv.1,15(1888).
12. See generally T. PLUCKNETI', supra note 10, at 570 (quoted exchange between
counsel on whether trespass action sounded in tort or contract).
13. Actions in debt were the exclusive province of the courts of common pleas. The
judges of the King's Bench, who had jurisdiction over assumpit, thus had considerable
incentive to permit the expansion of assumpit as an action in competition with debt.
Assumpit developed as a contractual action in King's Bench. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 443 (1923); T. P!..UCKNETT, supra note 10, at 576.
14. F. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CoNTRACTS§ 2, at 3 (1913).
15. 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.1602).
16. Id.
17. Professor Ames argues that Slade's Case was not the source of indebitatus
assumpsit; he maintains "instead that the holding of Slade's Case was the law at least 60
years before the case was decided. See Ames, supra note 11, at 16.
18. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B.1760).
19. Id.
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judgment for the plaintiff, Lord Mansfield answered. the defendant's
objections that there was no promise by observing:
If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of

natural justice, to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this
action, founded in the equity of the plaintiff's case, as it
were upon a contract ("quasi ex contractu," as the Roman law
expresses it). 20
Lord Mansfield was the first commentator to suggest that obligations
based upon fictional promises should be enforced.21
Lawyers continued to test the logical limits of the concept of
quasi-contract. They focused principal attention on the distinction
between actions in contract premised on a consensual agreement and
proceedings in quasi-contract grounded in ideas of unjust enrichment.22
As a result of this persistent probing, the doctrine of quasi-contract
evolved into "a peculiar hybrid, a residuary remedy supplementing the
contract and tort remedies of the common law and the wide range of
equitable remedies."23
The reach of quasi-contract has continued to expand; quasicontractual principles are applied in a wide variety of contemporary
situations. This breadth of application has resulted in much confusion.
One persistent source of difficulty, and the subject of this article, is the
definition of a benefit to the defendant sufficient to entitle a plaintiff
to recoverv
THE MEANING OF BENEFIT

Courts show substantial agreement that a defendant who receives a
tangible asset has received a recoverable benefit. 24 Since 1705, in
reliance on La mine v. Dorrell, 25 a plaintiff whose goods have been
converted and sold may dispense with his action in tort and proceed in

20. Id. at 678.
21. See F. WooDWARD, supra note14,§2,at4.
22. See J.DAWSON&R.PALMER, supra note6,at4.
23. I d. at 4-5.
24. See, e.g., City of Vernon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 378, 394, 12
Cal. Rptr. 701, 711 (1961) (use of electric system); Bellanca Corp. v. Bellanca, 53 Del. 378,
383, 169 A.2d 620, 623 (1961) (receipt of brokerage services); Estate of Phillips, 10 Misc.
2d 714, 716, 173 N.Y.S.2d 632, 635 (Sur. Ct. 1958) (receipt of money and labor); Bill v.
Gattavara, 34 Wash. 2d 645, 648, 209 P .2d 457, 459 (1949) (receipt of cash).
25. 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (K.B. 1705 ).
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quasi-contract. 26 Most American courts have followed the English
precedent and have allowed a quasi-contract action as an alternative to
a tort action in conversion.27 Since the existence of benefit in these
cases usually is clear, the question of whether a benefit sufficient to
allow recovery has been shown rarely is raised explicitly.
The plaintiff's right to waive the tort remedy and sue in quasicontract has not been so obvious when the defendant converter has not
resold the wrongfully acquired goods but instead has consumed or
retained them. Many American jurisdictions initially rejected the right of
a plaintiff to sue in quasi-contract where the converted goods had not
been resold. 28 Persistent criticism by respected scholars,Z 9 however,
eventually convinced most jurisdictions to allow quasi-contractual
recovery from a converter in the absence of resale. 30 The concepts of
benefit expressed in the older cases denying recovery if the converter
has not resold nevertheless provide an important starting point for an
analysis of the status of the idea of benefit in modern cases. Two
fundamental questions shape this analysis: whether the concept of
benefit in earlier cases was so narrow that courts would not afford relief

26. I d. at 303-04. The rules governing the definition of benefit in quasi-contract are identical whether the origin of the action is in contract or tort. Whether unjust enrichment
principles should be applied uniformly to quasi-contracts arising out of a tort, an express
contract, or an implied contract raises a broader and more controversial question. The
more traditional view holds that quasi-contract principles constitute a body of law sep·
arate from either tort or contract and thus are uniformly applicable to any relevant set of
facts. Some commentators have argued in recent years, however, that quasi-contract
actions based on the existence of an express contract should be resolved separately and
more in accordance with conventional contract law. See Childres & Garamella, The Law
of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in Contract, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 433, 439-40 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Childres & Garamella]; Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual
Context, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1208, 1215-19 (1973). But cf. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 189-90 (1959) (only benefit from analyzing quasi-contract
actions with traditional contract action is elimination of election of remedies problems).
27. See, e.g., Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1929); American Smelting &
Refining Co. v. Swisshelm Gold Silver Co., 63 Ariz. 204, 210-11, 160 P.2d 757, 760 (1945);
Canepa v. Sun Pacific Co., 126 Cal. App. 2d 706, 711, 272 P.2d 860, 864 (1954); Davidson
Grocery Co. v. Johnston, 24 Idaho 336,342-43, 133 P. 929,930 (1913); Downs v. Finnegan,
58Minn.112, 117, 59N.W. 981,982 (1894); Siegman v. Siegman, 155 Ore.l73, 182,62 P.2d
16, 20 (1936); Ferrous Products Co. v. Gulf States Trading Co., 323 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex.
App.1959).
28. See, e.g., Crowv. Boyd, 17 Ala. 51, 54 (1849); Woodruffv. Zaban & Son, 133 Ga. 24,
25-27, 65 S.E. 123, 123-24 (1909); Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 285, 289-90 (1827);
Capital Garage Co. v. Powell, 96 Vt. 227, 231, 118 A. 883, 885 (1922). See generally Annot.,97 A.L.R.250(1935).
29. See F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 76, at 122-23; Corbin, Waivero{TortandSuit
in Assumpsit, 19 YALE L.J. 221,229 (1910).
30. In a few jurisdictions the courts have not explicitly rejected the absence of resale as
an impediment to recovery in a quasi-contract. See, e.g., Janiszewski v. Behrmann, 345
Mich. 8, 36-39, 75 N.W.2d 77, 80-82 (1956) (dictum); McDonald v. First Nat 'I Bank, 353 Pa.
29, 32-33,44 A.2d 265, 266 (1945); Anderson Equipment Co. v. Findley, 350 Pa. 399,40102,39 A.2d 520,522 (1944).
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on restitutionary principles unless the converted goods were transformed into cash; and whether the restrictions of these older cases were
explicable on grounds unrelated to the existence or definition of
benefit.
Jones v. Hoar 31 is the leading American decision rejecting recovery in
quasi-contract absent a sale by the converter. The defendant in Jones
had entered plaintiff's property and removed valuable timber. No sale
of the timber by the defendant was shown. 32 In affirming a judgment
for the defendant in a summary opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court approvingly referred to the trial court's opinion, which
had cited a number of English and American decisions denying recovery
in quasi-contract on similar facts. 33 An examination of the cases cited
by the lower court in Jones suggests that the plaintiff was denied
recovery for two reasons. First, courts did not clearly perceive the
general concept of unjustified benefit as the underlying justification for
the range of actions that we call quasi-contract. The cases extracted by
the trial judge in Jones do not refer to the concept of benefit in the
abstract but only to some particular manifestation of benefit such as
money received or goods exchanged for money. 34 Second, neither the
trial nor the appellate court in Jones could find precedent for implying
a promise from the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant
necessary for recovery in quasi-contract. 35 Jones v. Hoar manifests a
persistent devotion to maintaining the strict integrity of existing legal
categories. The judges who decided the case were not philosophically
disposed to break new ground by infusing the idea of quasi-contract
with a concept that must have seemed dangerously flexible.
Many of the opinions following Jones v. Hoar provide no logical
justification for denying restitution against a converter in the absence
of a sale of the converted goods. 36 The Missouri Supreme Court stated
the case against recovery explicitly in Sandeen v. Kansas City, St.
Joseph & Council Bluffs Railway Co.: 37
The doctrine [permitting recovery in quasi-contract of the
value of converted goods not sold by the converter] came to
be extended by some courts to all cases in which the

31. 22Mass. (5Pick.)285(1827).
32. I d. at 285.
33. I d. at 289; see id. at 285·89 (footnote)(text oflower court's opinion).
34. Id. at 285-89 (footnote).
35. I d. at 290.
36. See Quimbyv. Lowell, 89 Me. 547, 549·50, 36 A. 902,903 (1907); Telford & F. Turn·
pike Co. v. Gerhab, 9 Sad. (Pa.) 550, 553, 13 A. 90,92 (1888) (per curiam).
37. 79 Mo. 278 (1883).
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wrong-doer had acquired a benefit by his wrong. It was
claimed that natural justice raised the promise upon the faith
of the benefit received.... This extension of the doctrine
would tend to do away with the action of tort, for perhaps in
a majority of the wrongs inflicted the wrong-doer receives
some benefit. 38
The court in Sandeen correctly perceived the consequences of a flexible
definition of the benefit necessary to recovery in restitution; like the
court in Jones, it found most compelling the impulse to preserve
existing legal categories and salvage something of the forms of action. 39
The cases denying recovery in quasi-contract for conversion without
sale represent an enduring strain of judicial hostility to quasicontractual recovery, even in situations where the defendant has acted
wrongly and has received a clear and tangible benefit. This judicial
hostility results partially from the courts' distaste for the role of
quasi-contract as a subverter of more conventional legal doctrines. No
doubt the courts that recognized the existence of a benefit did so only
grudgingly, because they were unable, as a matter of logic, to
distinguish between a converter who transformed goods into cash and a
converter who merely consumed or retained goods himself.
Determination of the existence of benefit in cases arising out of
actual or supposed contractual relationships follows standards substantially similar to those applicable in actions where the benefit results .
from the defendant's tortious conversion of goods. When a breaching
party is shown to have received a tangible benefit, courts have been
willing to force disgorgement on quasi-contractual grounds. 40 Whether
38. Id. at281·82.
39. See Holt v. Mackham [1923] 1 K.B. 504. In Holt Lord Scrutton, writing in 1923,
evidenced a similar dislike of quasi-contract because of the violence it does to established
legal categories. Lord Scrutton observed:
Now ever since the time when that great judge, Lord Mansfield, with no doubt a
praiseworthy desire to free the Court from the fetters of legal rules and enable them to
do what they thought to be right in each case ... the whole history of this particular
form of action has been what I may call a history of well-meaning sloppiness of
thought.
Id. at513.
40. Various reasons may explain why an aggrieved party chooses to sue in quasi·
contract rather than for damages for breach of contract. See,e.g., Elder v. Chapman, 176
Ill.142, 52 N.E.10 (1898) (gambling contract); Masseyv. Becker, 90 Ore. 461, 176 P. 425
(1918) (acceptance of payment after default may constitute waiver of breach); True v. J .B.
Deeds & Son, 151 Tenn. 630, 271 S.W. 41 (1925) (subject matter jurisdiction). Where the
plaintiff cannot establish the value of his expected losses with certainty an action in quasicontract becomes an attractive alternative that will permit judgment for the plaintiff. See
Shriver v. Cook, 256 Iowa 271, 278·79, 127 N.W.2d 102, 106-07 (1964). Professor Corbin has
objected to use of the term quasi-contract to describe a situation in which plaintiff seeks
restitution instead of bringing a damage action for breach of an express contract. 5 A.
CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1102 (1964). Corbin's view has not been adopted universally by the
courts. See Gladowski v. Felczak, 346 Pa. 660, 663-65,31 A.2d 718, 720 (1943).
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the defendant is a tortfeasor or a contract breacher, a showing that the
defendant unjustly has reaped a tangible gain at the expense of the
plaintiff usually will support recovery in quasi-contract.
If the benefit received by the defendant is neither concrete nor
readily quantified but incorporeal and difficult to measure, establishing
the existence of the benefit required for quasi-contract recovery
becomes more complicated. Phillips u. Homfray, 41 where the defendant
had used underground passages beneath the plaintiff's property to
transport coal, provides a starting point for analyzing the existence of
benefit when the defendant receives a less tangible gain. The plaintiff in
Phillips theorized that the net savings that accrued to the defendant as a
result of his wrongful use of plaintiff's land rightfully belonged to the
plaintiff on quasi-contractual grounds. 42 The court rejected the
argument, however, endorsing the defendant's contention that
"[u]nless some part of the Plaintiff's property can be traced into the
trespasser's estate, . . . his estate cannot be made liable •... " 43 The
majority reasoned that the defendant had taken nothing from the
plaintiff merely by carrying coal underneath plaintiff's property.44 A
dissenting judge attacked the notion that the defendant must possess
tangible property or proceeds of property belonging to plaintiff in
order to establish the necessary benefit and concluded that a plaintiff
need show only that defendant saved an expenditure or that his assets
increased because of failure to pay for the benefit received.45
The majority opinion in Phillips reflects the restrictive view of
benefit that plaintiff must establish that the defendant has gained
something concrete before recovery in quasi-contract will be available.
Other cases of the same era support this strict concept of benefit. In
Schillinger u. United States 46 the plaintiff alleged that the Government
had realized a savings of $250,000 in laying stone on the Capitol
grounds by using plaintiff's patented invention without compensating
the plaintiff.47 The Supreme Court assumed that receipt of a benefit by
the Government had been shown but nevertheless rejected plaintiff's

41. 24Ch.D.439(1883).
42. I d. at 439-40.
43. I d. at 449.
44. I d. at 462.
45. Id. at 471 (Baggallay, L.J., dissenting). The theory that plaintiff need only show
tnat defendant saved an expenditure or increased his assets, which Lord Justice Baggallay
asserted as a basis for recovery, has been followed more widely in England that in the
United States. See Gutteridge & David, The Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment, 5 CAMB.
L.J. 204, 223·229 (1934).
46. 155 U.S.163 (1894).
47. Id. atl63·65.
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claim, concluding that quasi-contract was not available absent a
showing of a meeting of the minds. 48 The Court further suggested that
even if quasi-contract were appropriate no sufficient benefit had been
shown, because the plaintiff had not established what property of his
the Government had appropriated. 49 The Court thus restricted the
concept of benefit to palpable gain; the plaintiff's assertion that
expenses saved by the defendant constituted a cognizable benefit
simply fell outside the definition of benefit that the court was willing
to accept. 50
State court decisions in the nineteenth century, frequently involving
straying farm animals, adopted a similarly narrow view of benefit. If a
defendant's trespassing cattle or sheep consumed the plaintiff's crop or
pastureland, the defendant's gain was not difficult to establish since a
measurable quantum of plaintiff's crops or pasture grass had been
ingested. 51 The benefit to defendant becomes more obscure, however,
where straying animals invade plaintiff's field, trampling but not
consuming crops, even though a loss to plaintiff is self-evident. In
Tightmeyer v. Mongold 52 the defendant's cattle had trespassed on
plaintiff's property, but plaintiff could not prove that any grass or grain
had been consumed.5 3 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the absence
of tangible benefit to defendant was fatal to plaintiff's quasi-contract
claim regardless of how great his loss might be.54 That same term the
Kansas court again rejected the opportunity to broaden the concept of
benefit. The court's summary opinion in Fanson v. Linsley 55 reflects its
conviction that benefit in quasi-contract was not an abstract concept
that courts could manipulate flexibly to improve a desperate
plaintiff's chance for recovery. 56 The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire previously had rendered an opinion that depended upon an
equally conservative definition of benefit. 57
These American cases are united in spirit \vith the decision in Phillips
v. Homfray. 58 Although the facts of the cases differed, each reflects an
48. ld. at 169, 170-71.
49. Id. at 172.
50. Professor Woodward has criticized the narrow view of benefit endorsed in Schillinger. See F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 275, at 443-445.
51. See, e.g., Tsuboi v. Cohn, 40 Idaho 102, 107, 231 P. 708, 709-10 (1924); Gillespie v.
Hendren, 98 Mo. App. 622, 626-27, 73 S.W. 361, 362 (1903); Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont.
316,320, 326, 61 P. 863,864,866 (1900).
52. 20 Kan. 90 (1878).
53. I d. at 92.
54. Id.
55. 20 Kan. 235 (1878).
56. See id. at 238-39.
57. See Pagev. Babbit, 21 N.H. 389,391-92 (1850).
58. 24 Ch. D. 439 (1883).
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implicit fear that adoption of a broader definition of benefit would
expand the concept of quasi-contract. Like the Massachussetts court's
decision in Jones v. Hoar, 59 these cases constituted part of an active,
although perhaps unconscious, effort to restrict the development of
quasi-contract. Countervailing tendencies already were exerting powerful pressure, but decisions like Schillinger and Tightmeyer should serve
as reminders that the judicial expansion 9f the definition of benefit was
not as inevitable as it now may seem.
Although a venerable strain of American case law exists that defines
benefit narrowly so as to preclude recovery where the plaintiff has not
proven tangible gain by the defendant, most jurisdictions in recent
times have developed a much broader definition of benefit. 60 The
Vrrginia Supreme Court decision in Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball 61
typifies this recent trend. The defendant in Raven Red had acquired
both mineral rights in plaintiff's land and an easement to construct a
railroad to transport the coal extracted from the plaintiff's property;
the defendant later obtained mineral rights to parcels surrounding the
land of the plaintiff and used the railroad to transport coal mined on
those adjoining tracts. 62 The plaintiff instituted an action in quasicontract to recover the benefit received by defendant from using the
railroad to transport coal other than that mined on plaintiff's
property. 63 The unjust benefit assertedly received by the defendant in
Raven Red was clearly intangible; no property belonging to the plaintiff
could be traced to defendant's hands. The gain alleged was similar to
that rejected as a basis for recovery in Phillips v. Homfray 64 - an
expense saved by the defendant. The court in Raven Red recognized
that other jurisdictions had refused to find a gain on similar facts, 65 but
affirmed plaintiff's recovery. The court reasoned:

59. 22Mass.(5Pick.)285(1827); see notes:h-35 supra andaccompanyingtext.
60. See, e.g., Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 423-24, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1030·31
(1936) (benefit from use of cavern running under plaintiff's land); Carmichael v. Old
Straight Creek Coal Corp., 232 Ky.133, 140-42,22 S.W.2d 572, 576 (1929) (benefit from use
of railway over plaintiff's land); DeCamp v. Bullard, 159 N.Y. 450, 454-55, 54 N.E. 26, 28
(1899) (benefit from use of plaintiff's stream); Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va.
534, 542-43, 39 S.E.2d 231, 235-36 (1946) (benefit from wrongful use of easement). See gen·
erally Annot., 167 A.L.R. 796 (1947).
61. 185 Va. 534,39 S.E.2d231 (1946).
62. I d. at 537-38, 39 S.E.2d at 232-33.
63. Id. at 538, 39 S.E.2d at 232-33. Recovery in quasi-contract for the value of use and
occupancy of land traditionally has been denied in the absence of a landlord·tenant rela·
tionship. See Lockwood v. Thunder Bay River Boom Co., 42 Mich. 536, 538·39, 4 N.W.
292,293 (1880). The reasons for this restriction on recovery for use and occupation of land
are mainly historical. See AMES, LECTURESONLEGALHISI'ORY 167·71 (1913).
64. 24Ch.D.439(1883); see notes41-45 supra andaccompanyingtext.
65. 185 Va. at 543-48, 39 S.E.2d at 235-238; see Annot., 167 A.L.R. 796, 803·05 (1947).
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The illegal transportation of the coal in question across
plaintiff's land was intentional, deliberate and repeated from
time to time for a period of years. Defendant has no moral or
legal right to enrich itself by this illegal use of plaintiff's
property.... Natural justice plainly requires the law to imply
a promise to pay a fair value of the benefits received.
Defendant's estate has been enhanced by just this much. 66
The court did not distinguish between a concrete gain and an intangible
benefit. In asserting that the fundamental question concerned whether
the plaintiff had received an unjustified benefit, the court concluded
that it would be illogical to deny recovery merely because the
defendant's gain did not assume tangible form. 67
Whether a particular court chooses to define benefit strictly or
liberally, in order to obtain relief in quasi-contract the plaintiff must
show receipt by the defendant of a gain that justifiably should be
restored to the plaintiff. The phrase "unjust enrichment" presumes the
existence of some benefit wrongfully acquired. Despite black letter
statements that a gain must be shown to justify recovery, 68 however, a
substantial body of cases arguably have allowed recovery in
quasi-contract even in the absence of any demonstrable benefit to the
defendant. 69 A long line of scholars have noted this anomalous result
and have offered various explanations, including the theory that the
remedy is intended primarily to restore the status quo ante. 70 Some
66. Id. at 548, 39 S.E.2d at 238 (footnote omitted).
67. I d. at 547, 39 S.E.2d at 237. The court in Raven Red reasoned that since the defendant benefits substantially from his own wrongdoing regardless of the injury he inflicts
on the plaintiff, an implied promise to compensate plaintiff should be found even where the
defendant's actions do nothing to diminish the value of the plaintiff's property. I d.
68. See RESTATEMENTOFCoNTRACTS§348,comment a, at591-92(1932).
69. See, e.g., Williams v. Dougan, 175 Cal. App. 2d 414,415-418,346 P.2d 241, 242-44
(1959) (plaintiff recovered monies expended on care of animals that defendant inherited
but for which she had no concern); People's Nat1 Bank v. Magruder, 77 Fla. 235, 244-46,
81 So. 440, 443-44 (1919) (landlord's leasehold improvements made in reliance on tenant's
oral agreement to extend lease constitutes benefit to tenant); Vickery v. Ritchie, 202
Mass. 247, 250-52, 88 N.E. 835, 836 (1909) (defendant received no benefit when plaintiff
made unsuccessful business investment; recovery nevertheless allowed); Clement v.
Rowe, 33 S.D. 499, 505-07, 146 N.W. 700, 701-02 (1914) (land transferred to third party at
defendant's direction); Abrams v. Financial Serv. Co., 13 Utah 2d 343, 346, 374 P.2d 309,
311 (1962) (prospective buyer gained nothing from home improvements since sale was not
finalized, but seller allowed recovery); cf. Campbell v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 421
F.2d 293, 294·97 (5th Cir. 1969) (since valuation of benefit difficult, fair marliet value of
services or products used to determine plaintiff's recovery); Maragos v. City of Minot, 191
N.W.2d 570, 572 (N.D. 1971) (dictum) (inverse condemnation proceeding; recovery available on implied contract theory despite absence of benefit to Government).
70. See D. DOBBS, THE LAw OF REMEDIES 792 (1973); Childres & Garamella at 436-37;
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 394
(1937); Henderson, supra note 5, at 1147; Patterson, The Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 1 Mo. L. REV. 223, 230 (1936); Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Con·
text, 73 CoLUM. L. REV.1208, 1219·1226 (1973).
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commentators have maintained that quasi-contract served as a
respectable disguise for the award of reliance damages before courts
recognized reliance losses as an appropriate basis for measuring recovery
in breach of contract actions;71 another asserts that courts in deciding
cases that arise from the breach of personal service contracts have
dispensed with the requirement that a benefit be shown simply to
protect the legitimate interests of plaintiffs who might go uncompensated otherwise. 72 'One commentator unreasonably ascribes the
recovery of damages without requiring a showing of gain to judicial
ignorance of elementary distinctions in the law of quasi-contract. 73
Whatever the correct explanation of this trend may be, any inquiry into
the definition of benefit must account for those cases ostensibly
decided on quasi-contractual grounds that permit recovery without
requiring a finding of gain.
The clear preference of American courts in this century has been to
relax and in some instances to dispense with the requirement that
benefit be shown before quasi-contractual recovery is allowed. In this
judicial environment, the definition of benefit has varied depending
upon the exigencies of a particular case. Some courts consider benefit
to be any net gain measurable in monetary terms. 74 Other courts have
refused to eliminate explicitly the requirement that a benefit be proved
but nonetheless have found the necessary benefit on facts establishing a
most tenuous gain. 75 The Restatement of Restitution also specifically
71. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 70, at 393-94.
72. Note, supra note 2, at 1267. Personal service contracts raise significantly different
problems in the determination of unjust gain than do contracts for the sale of goods or
other tangible property. See REsrATEMENT OF REsriTUTION § 40 & comment a, at 155
(1937); Childres & Garamella at 451.
73. See 1970 DUKE L.J. 573, 581·82. The author criticizes the Fifth Circuit for its decision in CampbeU v. Tennessee VaUey Authority, in which the court permitted recovery
in quasi-contract measured by the market value of plaintiff's services in preparing
microfilms rather than by the value received by the defendant. I d.; see 421 F.2d 293, 294·
97 (5th Cir. 1969). The author attributes the court's decision to its failure to distinguish
between contracts implied in law and contracts implied in fact. See 1970 DuKE L.J. at
581·82. The author fails to perceive, however, that the fundamental and threshold problem
raised by CampbeU is not the proper standard for measuring benefit, but instead whether
the defendant received any benefit at all. See 421 F .2d at 298 (Rives, J ., dissenting).
74. See Ablah v. Eyman, 188 Kan. 665, 678·79, 365 P.2d 181, 191-92 (1961); Indepen·
dent Electric Lighting Corp. v. M. Brodsky & Co., 118 Misc. 561, 563, 194 N.Y.S.1, 2 (Sup.
Ct.1972).
75. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F .2d 586, 592-93 (5th Cir. 1957)
(unsuccessful exploration for mineral deposits); H.W. Kastor & Sons Adv. Co. v. Grove
Labs., 58 F. Supp. 1011, 1016·17 (E.D. Mo. 1945) (unsuccessful advertising campaign);
Meyer v. Parobek, 119 Cal. App. 2d 509, 511-12, 259 P.2d 948, 950·51 (1953) (sale of assets
in bankruptcy to satisfy creditors); Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 41 Utah 404, 407.08,
125 P. 860, 861·62 (1912) (advertising benefits where defendant ceased operation). Some
courts have arrived at a more restrictive view of benefit. See General Metals, Inc. v.
Green Fuel Economizer Co., 213 F. Supp. 641, 652 (D. Md. 1963); Tramonte v. A.J.
Rasmussen & Sons, 167 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
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sanctions recovery on unjust enrichment principles for the preservation
of life and health even though the measurement of longer life or better
health cannot be translated easily into dollar amounts.76 A substantial
body of case law similarly supports recovery in quasi-contract for the
wrongful use of plaintiff's ideas,77 even though the precise measurement of defendant's gain in such cases often has proved difficult.78
Procedural reforms, such as the adoption of Field Codes and the
growing influence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, also have
contributed to the expansion of the concept of benefit. By eroding the
restrictive influence of the common law forms of action, these reforms
have freed courts from excessive concern over whether a
quasi-contractual remedy conflicts with the theory of plaintiff's
action. 79 'Result-oriented courts therefore may have expanded the
concept of benefit without any intellectual direction.
76. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 116 (1937); see Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601,
605-08, 104 S.W. 164, 165-66 (1907); In re Crisan's Estate, 362 Mich. 569, 574·76, 107
N.W.2d 907, 910·11 (1961).
77. See, e.g., Servo Corp. v. General Electric Co., 337 F.2d 716, 722-25 (4th Cir. 1964);
Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1953); DeFillips v. Chrysler
Corp., 53 F. Supp. 977, 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Liggett & Myer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101
Ind. App. 420, 429-431, 194 N.E. 206, 210 (1935). See generally Havighurst, The Right to
Compensation for an Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 295 (1954); Annot., 170 A.L.R. 449 (1947).
78. See Sheldon v. Metro·Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 403-05 (1940); Havighurst, supra note 77, at 299·300.
79. See Murphy v. Lifschitz, 49 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440-42 (Sup. Ct. 1944), affd 294 N.Y.
892, 63 N.E.2d 26 (1945) (per curiam). The plaintiff in Murphy, a purchaser of liquor
under a sales contract, brought an action for specific performance or, alternatively, damages after defendant seller failed to deliver the contract goods. Id. at 440. Defendant
had sold the subject liquor in the black market at a price substantially above the contract
price. Id. Finding no basis for awarding plaintiff a substantial recovery on a breach of
contract theory, the court instead awarded plaintiff recovery measured by defendant's
profit: the difference between contract price and black market price. Id. at 441-42. The
court evidenced no discomfort in awarding relief measured by a quasi-contract standard
even though the plaintiff's action had been brought on the contract.
The trend toward a liberal definition of benefit has not been without negative impact;
flexible definitions of benefit have further confused the muddled meaning of benefit and
have exacerbated the difficulty of framing damage awards in quasi-contract. The good
samaritan cases involving physicians illustrate the difficulty of determining damages
under a broad definition of benefit. The plaintiff physician may properly persuade the
court that defendant's improved health is a sufficient benefit to justify a recovery, but ar·
ticulation of a rational and consistent monetary standard that could be used to measure
the value of defendant's improved health is quite difficult. See Comment, supra note 2, at
545. Courts that have awarded recovery in these good samaritan cases measure the dam·
ages by the value of plaintiff's services rather than the benefit conferred on the defendant.
See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 606-07, 104 S.W. 164, 166 (1907); Ladd v. Witte, 116
Wis. 35, 40,92 N.W. 365,367 (1902). This measure of recovery conflicts with the theory of
the action, however, which asserts that the defendant has received an unjustified benefit.
To award recovery measured by the value of plaintiff's services without inquiring into
whether the value approximates defendant's unjust gain may be the only convenient basis
for measuring the award; it nevertheless begs the question confronting the court in quasi·
contract actions. Although plaintiff's recovery historically has been measured by the value
of his services and not their value to the defendant, application of this general rule does not
answer the argument that courts should consider the defendant's gain; in quantum meruit
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THE CHILDRES-GARAMELLA HYPOTHESIS:

A

RATIONAL CoNTROL MEcHANISM?

Against this background of ongoing judicial redefinition of benefit,
Robert Childres and Jack Garamella published a major article setting
forth an analytical framework within which quasi-contract actions
properly may be confined. 8 ° Childres and Garamella do not discuss
specifically the concept of benefit as an idea common to the wide range
of quasi-contract actions but limit the applicability of their theory to
suits growing out of express contracts. Observing that quasi-contract
principles have been overly utilized,81 the authors contend that a clear
distinction should be made between quasi-contract actions where an
actual benefit is conferred and those actions to recover the reasonable
value of expenses and services; Childres and Garamella argue that only
the former situation presents an appropriate setting for the application
of unjust enrichment theory. 82 The "reasonable value" cases, long
assumed to be based upon unjust enrichment principles, are simply
reliance damage actions. 83
The factual distinction between "actual benefit" and "reasonable
value" cases may be simply illustrated. Assume A contracts 'vith B to
sell a new automobile to B for $3,000. B gives A his check for the
$3,000 purchase price, but A refuses to deliver the promised autoactions the plaintiff's services ordinarily are requested, but in good samaritan cases the defendant frequently makes no such request. See Edson v. Hammond, 142 App. Div. 693,
696, 127 N.Y.S. 359, 360 (1911). See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 113, com·
ment g, at 473-74 (1937) (appropriate measure of damage in good samaritan cases is value
of plaintiff's services).
Some courts have held that a plaintiff's recovery cannot be limited to nominal damages
simply because it is difficult to assign a monetary value to an intangible benefit. See Shell
Petroleum Corp. v. Scully, 71 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1934) (unauthorized exploration for
minerals; recovery not limited to nominal damages despite difficulties of measuring benefit); Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 427·28, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1031·33 (1936) (tres·
pass on cavern partially beneath plaintiff's property; plaintiff entitled to one-third of net
profits of tourist enterprise where benefit difficult to apportion). See also Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190, 191 (Tex. Comm. Civ. App. 1925), modified andre·
manded, 291 S.W. 538 (1927) (recovery cannot be limited to nominal damages because of
uncertainty of defendant's benefit from unauthorized drilling on plaintiff's property),
80. See Childres & Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in
Contract, 64 Nw. U .L. REv. 433 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Childres & Garamella].
81. See id. at 444.
82. I d. at 435·36.
83. Id. at 437-39, 457. See also Fuller & Perdue (parts 1 & 2), supra note 83, at 52,
373. Fuller and Perdue identify three interests that courts have recognized-explicitly or
implicitly-when awarding contract damages: a restitution interest, which describes the
claim of a promisee who has conferred some value on the promisor in reliance on the
contract; a reliance interest, which is premised on the promisee's claim to expenses
incurred in reliance on the contract but that have not benefitted the promisor; and an
expectancy interest, which reflects the promisee's claim to the value that the breaching
party's promise represents. I d. at 53-54.
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mobile. Since A has been enriched tangibly to the extent of $3,000, an
action in quasi-contract to compel disgorgement of A's unjustified gain
would properly lie. According to the Childres-Garamella hypothesis,
this fact pattern presents a case of "actual enrichment." Assume next
that A agrees to custom build an automobile for B at a contract price of
$10,000. A purchases the necessary materials at a cost of $5,000 and
hires an assistant at a salary of $1,500. The materials prove unsuitable,
however, and the assistant is incompetent; A therefore discards the
materials, discharges his assistant, purchases new materials at a cost of
$6,000, and engages a new assistant at a salary of $1,800. As work on
the automobile begins anew, B repudiates the contract. A brings an
action to recover $15,000 representing the cost of materials, the salary
expense of his assistants, and the value of his own labor. This fact
pattern presents a "reasonable value" case in which reliance, rather than
quasi-contract principles, should. apply.
Childres and Garamella's analysis also addresses the question of
whether an aggrieved party suing in quasi-contract after part performance can recover only according to the underlying contract rate.84
The question of when and to what extent recovery should be allowed in
excess of the contract rate relates directly to the concept of benefit in
quasi-contract, since courts implicitly must determine the extent of the
defendant's benefit in deciding whether recovery should exceed the
contract rate. 85 · Childres and Garamella propose no solution to this
question, concluding only that recovery should be limited to the
contract rate in some cases and not in others. 86 The authors do suggest
some guidelines for distinguishing between these two types of cases.
Suppose A contracts to supply B with 100 rifles at a unit cost of $100.
A delivers the first 30 rifles but at a unit cost of $300. B then
repudiates the agreement, and A sues in quasi-contract for $9,000- the
cost of manufacturing the rifles. 87 Under the Childres-Garamella

84. See W. KEENER, supra note 6, at 289; F. WooDWARD, supra note 14, § 268, at 430·
31. The great majority of American courts have permitted recovery in quasi-contract in
excess of the contract price. See, e.g., Southern Painting Co. v. United States, 222 F .2d
431, 433-34 (lOth Cir. 1955); Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 578 (Cal. Dist. App. 1933);
Heitz v. Sayers, 32 Del. 207, 218-20, 121 A. 225,230-31 (1923). See generally Palmer, The
Contract Price as a Limit on Restitution for Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 264
(1959). Only a few jurisdictions have denied recovery in excess of the contract
rate. See Kehoev. Mayor & Common Council, 56 N.J.L. 23,26-27,27 A. 912,913 (Sup. Ct.
1893); Doolittle & Chamberlain v. McCullough, 12 Ohio St. 360, 365-67 (1861).
85. See Childres&Garamellaat446-47.
86. Id. at 457-58.
87. See Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1965),
rev 'don other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966) (restitution available on similar facts; remand
to determine why costs exceeded contract rate).
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analysis, whether A may recover more than the $3,000 contract price
depends on why the expenses incurred by A exceeded the contract rate.
Courts should permit recovery in excess of the contract rate where the
additional costs were incurred not because of A's inefficient operation
but because the "real" value of the rifles when completed and delivered
exceeded the contract price. Such recovery should be allowed because
A is not casting the additional cost of his incompetence on the
defendant but rather seeks to obtain only a return of the increment of
"real" value above the contract price unjustly received by B.88
The Childres-Garamella hypothesis has major implications for the law
of quasi-contract and the concept of benefit. By narrowly defining
benefit to include only cases in which the defendant can be shown to
have obtained "real" gain, the authors' theory contracts the area of the
law to which unjust enrichment principles should apply. 89 This narrow
definition of benefit excludes from the ambit of quasi-contract law
innumerable cases that traditionally have been decided by applying
quasi-contract concepts. 90 ' In arguing that cases growing out of an
explicitly contractual setting are more appropriately decided on
reliance theory, Childres and Garamella inject a useful control
mechanism into the law of quasi-contract by which the outer limits of
the remedy may be more rationally defined.
The Childres-Garamella hypothesis is not without defects. By
limiting their inquiry to quasi-contract actions arising out of actual
contractual relations, 91 the authors do not analyze directly the
multitude of quasi-contract actions that arise in tort or that do not
depend on any underlying express contract. The tangled history of
quasi-contract and its broad application militate against such a
compartmentalization of the doctrine into neat, self-contained
segments. Quasi-contract resulted from the need to supplement a
variety of tort and implied contract remedies and has developed
without sharp distinctions based on the origin of the action. Childres
and Garamella may be correct in objecting to such imprecision as the

88. Under the Childres-Garamella analysis, A could recover costs in excess of the
contract rate even if they did not represent a "real" increase in value of the rifle to the
extent that his additional expense represented startup costs that increased the production
costs of earlier units. See Childres & Garamella at 445.
89. See id. at 443.
90. See Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1965),
rev 'don other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966) (non-defaulting plaintiff recovers reasonable
cost of performance); Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 578 (Cal. Dist. App. 1933) (plaintiff
recovers cost of performance less inefficiency loss).
91. See Childres & Garamella at 433-37.
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root of much confused thinking about quasi-contract, but the history
and purposes of the action cannot be ignored. 92
Childres and Garamella's fundamental distinction between actions in
which the plaintiff seeks to recover "real" enrichment or gain and those
in which the plaintiff seeks to recover the "reasonable value" of his
effort also raises difficulties. The authors themselves observe that the
Restatement of Restitution does not recognize the distinction between
cases of "real gain" and "reasonable value. " 93 They also concede
indirectly that a substantial body of case law relevant to their
hypothesis yields no explicit recognition of the theory they assert. 94
Although the distinction between "real gain" and "reasonable value" is
valid in the sense that those co~cepts represent very different means of
measuring recovery in restitution, 95 no other established scholar in the
field has based a comprehensive analysis of quasi-contract on that
distinction. In arguing that this distinction provides a rationalizing
principle that will allow the orderly classification of a vast body of
quasi-contract cases, Childres and Garamella move well beyond current
thinking. 96
In criticizing courts for awarding a restitution recovery in excess of
the contract rate, the authors assert that any rational measurement of
damages in restitution should reflect, to the maximum extent possible,
the allocation of risks agreed upon by the parties themselves in their
contract. 97 'Although Childres and Garamella claim that their approach
will preserve the parties' respective positions under the contract, the
risks allocated by the parties to control the amount of a recovery in
quasi-contract actually do not determine recovery under the ChildresGaramella formula. For example, assume that a manufacturer contracts
to sell tanks to the Government at $10,000 each, that the Government
repudiates, and that the plaintiff proves that the cost of manufacturing
each tank delivered before breach was $20,000. Under the Childres-

92. Professor Dawson has observed correctly that "we can probably say now that
damage remedies can be ignored and quasi-contract used as to any kind of legal wrong
from which gains are realized." J. DAWSON, supra note 1, at 23. A remedy that is so
broadly based and that has so many potential applications cannot be compartmentalized
satisfactorily in the manner Childres and Garamella suggest.
93. Childres & Garamella at 436; see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 149 (1937).
94. See Childres & Garamella at 435·36.
95. See 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 40, § 1113; Note, Contracts: Remedies for Total
Breach of Contract: Restitution and ''Damages," 43 CoRNELL L. REV. 274, 279 (1957).
96. Childres and Garamella suggest that other commentators may not have suggested
their hypothesis earlier because certain legal concepts vital to an understanding of the
larger theory, such as the reliance interest or restitution itself, are of relatively recent
origin. See Childres & Garamelia at 433-34.
97. Id. at 446.
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Garamella hypothesis, recovery nonetheless \vould be limited to the
contract rate of $10,000; recovery in excess of the contract rate would
not be allowed because the plaintiff must not be permitted to shift its
contractual loss to the Government where the loss is caused by its own
ineffectiveness. If the plaintiff can show that the tanks have a "real"
value of $15,000 each, however, the Childres-Garamella approach
would entitle the manufacturer to $15,000 for each tank delivered. 98
Assume next that the tanks have a "real" value 50 percent greater
than the contract price because the cost of steel increased substantially
between the date of contract and the date of breach. In fixing the price
of tanks at $10,000 with no provision for upward adjustment if the
cost of materials increased, the parties presumably allocated the risk of
higher material costs to the plaintiff. In an ordinary contract action,
absent breach by the Government, the plaintiff would be unable,
except under extraordinary circumstances, to recover the additional
cost of steel. 99 The Childres-Garamella hypothesis would allow recovery
of the "real" value of the tanks, however, presumably reflecting the
increased costs of steel. Childres and Garamella recognize this inconsistency in their thesis but urge that the analogy to cases in which the
breaching party receives money and is required to disgorge that gain is
too close to arrive at any different result where the "real" value of the
goods the defendant receives exceeds the contract rate. 100 In presenting
their hypothesis the authors should at least explain more fully why in
some cases the allocation of risks should be shifted radically from that
provided for by the parties. In these cases Childres and Garamella
abandon the basic assumption of their analysis that recovery should be
based on the allocation of risks agreed on by the parties. Ironically, the
authors cast aside this assumption because of precedent-courts always
have given restitution in cases of actual enrichment without reference
to the contract rate 101 -a reason they condemn elsewhere as the cause
of much muddled thinking in the area of quasi-contract. The
Childres-Garamella position forces the conclusion that the defendant in
the preceeding example should pay $15,000 per tank despite the lower
contract price only because the defendant is a bad man and deserves
punishment for breaking the contract. 102
98. See id. at 443.
99. See UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-615, comment 4; 6 A. CoRBIN, supra note 40,
§1333.
100. See Childres & Garamella at 443.
101. Seeid.
102. Despite the natural conclusion of their hypothesis, Childres and Garamella term
the use of the bad man standard for measuring contract damages "nonsense." See id.
at435.
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The greatest failing of the Childres-Garamella analysis may be its
assumption that the plaintiff can easily prove the fundamental
economic distinctions necessary to proper application of the ChildresGaramella test. The existence of rules distinguishing between costs that
are attributable to plaintiff's inefficiency and those that confer "real"
benefits on the defendant, of course, would be useful for measuring
recovery in quasi-contract. Cases are tried and decided, however, by
judges, lawyers, and juries wholly unskilled in economic analysis. 103
Moreover, economists concede that the measurement of the economic
efficiency of a particular production process presents many difficulties.
Although the concept of inefficiency theoretically may not be difficult
to grasp, the precise measurement of the inefficiency of a particular
production process is not a simple task. One crucial factor in that
measuring process, for example, is the potential gain in efficiency that
would result if the plaintiff had made better use of scale economies. 104
The accurate measurement of economic efficiency must account for
factors such as planning, designing, and organizing, which are not easily
quantified. 105 Furthermore, the performance of a single contract that is
the subject of litigation may provide an inaccurate measurement of
efficiency.106 Finally, costs of production may yield precious little
information about the efficiency of plaintiff's manufacturing operation
absent a comparison of plaintiff's operations with those of similar
firms. Such comparative studies multiply the variables relevant to
determining what part of plaintiff's costs result from his inefficiency.107
The application of the Childres-Garamella hypothesis even in the
simple case would require considerable economic expertise. Modem
quasi-contract claims often arise in complicated litigation involving
substantial sums of money and a multitude of second and third tier
subcontractors. 108 The proper application of Childres and Garamella's
103. Legal scholars have shown a growing interest in the relationship between law and
economics. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); Leff, Economic Analysis ofLaw: SomeRealismAboutNominalism, 60VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
104. Scale economics are defined as "reductions in cost per unit of product manufactured and sold associated with the operation of large as compared to small production,
distribution, and merchandising." Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in IDUSTRIAL CoNCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING 16 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, &
J. Westoneds.1974).
105. See McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Scale, in INDUSTRIAL CoNCENTRATION:
THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 104, at 65. See generally id. at 65·88.
106. See id. at 58·59.
107. See id. at 61·65.
108. See Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 535-36 (Ct. Cl. 1965),
rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966); General Metals, Inc. v. Green Fuel Econo·
mizer Co., 213 F. Supp. 641,642-43 (D. Md.1963).
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theory to such cases would enmesh the court in a morass of conflicting
economic evidence further complicating litigation that is already
sufficiently perplexing. 109 One reason courts frequently remedy
defendant's unjust benefit by awarding plaintiff his reliance or out of
pocket losses is because the task of quantifying benefit is not a practical
alternative.
Although Childres and Garamella bring some measure of order to this
muddled area of the law, the authors attempt to push their reasoning
too far. Modem courts and scholars still view quasi-contract as a
doctrine to be pressed into service when the application of more
conventional doctrines would not yield a result that is compelled by
natural justice.110 The power of scholarship to impose order in this
field seems more limited than Childres and Garamella are willing to
concede.

Is BENEFIT ENouGH?
MORAL POSTURE OF THE PLAINTIFF

Professor Woodward defines quasi-contracts as "legal obligations
arising ... from the receipt of a benefit the retention of which is
unjust, and requiring the obligor to make restitution." 111 As this
observation suggests, the plaintiff must show not only that the benefit
received by the defendant is legally sufficient but also that retention of
the benefit by defendant at the expense of the plaintiff is unjust. The
moral posture of the plaintiff-the "justice" of his claim-thus
becomes important to the success of his action. 112 If the quasi-contract
action arises out of tort, the defendant is by definition the wrongdoer
and the plaintiff has the superior moral position. In quasi-contract cases
109. See Childres & Burgess, Seller's Remedies: The Primacy of UCC 2·708(2), 48
N.Y.U.L. REv. 833, 847 (1973) (recognition by Professor Childres of limitations of
economic analysis).
110. See Coleman Engineering Co. v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 396, 410, 55
Cal. Rptr. 1, 11,420 P.2d 713, 723 (1966) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting); Dyer Constr. Co. v.
Elias Constr. Co., 287 N.E.2d 262,264 (Ind. 1972); Clark v. Peoples Sav. &Loan Ass'n, 221
Ind. 168, 172, 46 N.E.2d 681, 682 (1943); J. DAWSON, supra note 1, at 8;
Note, supra note 2, at 1267. Quasi-contract frequently has been utilized where the plain·
tiff's argument is not supported by more traditional concepts of recovery. See Minsky's
Follies, Inc. v. Sennes, 206 F.2d 1, 2·3 (5th Cir. 1953) (plaintiff incurred great cost in expec•
tation of sale). See also Fildew v. Besley, 42 Mich. 100, 101, ·3 N.W. 278, 279 (1879)
(dictum) (fire destroyed structure before completion; quasi·contract supplements tradi·
tional contract concepts but recovery denied).
111. F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 2, at 4.
112. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Introductory Note §§ 150·159, at 596 (1937)
(moral position of plaintiff a factor in measuring extent of plaintiff's recovery). See gen·
erally Childres & Garamella at 443; 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 40, § 1112.
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arising from express contracts, the problem of assigning moral fault also
presents no difficulty since the defendant usually has breached.
Complications arise, however, where the plaintiff has breached an
express contract but attempts to establish that retention by the
defendant of an aclmowledged benefit is unjust because the value of the
plaintiff's performance exceeds the damages inflicted by his breach.U 3
The inflexible application of a rule broadly denying the right to
recovery to defaulting plaintiffs would produce many harsh results. 114
Many courts avoid harsh results by refusing to follow the rule denying
plaintiff's right to recovery. 115 In other jurisdictions that purport to
follow the harsh majority rule, judges have devised legal fictions to
permit plaintiff's recovery without explicitly overruling earlier cases.U 6
The majority rule denying recovery to defaulting plaintiffs despite a
net benefit to defendant received its first authoritative expression in
Stark u. Parker. 117 The plaintiff in Stark had agreed to work for
defendant for a year with his compensation payable at the end of the
term. The plaintiff without legal excuse left defendant's employ before
the expiration of the contract but brought suit in quasi-contract to
recover the value of the services that he had rendered prior to the
breach.118 Plaintiff's counsel argued that plaintiff should recover in
quantum meruit conceding that the defendant's damages from the
breach should be deducted from plaintiff's recovery; the court,
however, refused recovery altogether. 119 'Writing for the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Justice Lincoln flatly rejected the idea
"that a party who deliberately • . . enters into an engagement and

113. See, e.g., Varnerv. Hardy, 209 Ala. 575, 575-76, 96 So. 860,861-62 (1923); Fritts v.
Quinton, 118 Kan. 111, 112·13, 233 P. 1036, 1037-38 (1925); Waite v. C.E. Shoemaker &
Co., 50 Mont. 264,274-75, 146 P. 736, 738 (1915); Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 356,
384 P.2d 396,397 (1963). See generally Lee,PlaintiffinDefault, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1023,
1025·27 (1966).
114. Application of the rule denying recovery to defaulting plaintiffs penalizes most
severely the plaintiff who has rendered a major part of his promised performance.
See Freedinan v. Rector, Warden & Vestrymen, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 22,230 P.2d 629, 632 (1951).
115. See, e.g., Porter v. Whitlock, 142 Iowa 66, 68·69, 120 N.W. 649, 650 (1909);
McKnight v. Bertram Heating & Plumbing Co., 65 Kan. 859, 70 P. 345, 346 (1902) (per
curiam) (en bane) (opinion not contained in official reporter); Miles Homes, Inc. v.
Starrett, 23 Wis. 2d 356, 360·61, 127 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1964).
116. See Joachim v. Andover Silver Co., 104 N.H. 18, 21, 177 A.2d 394, 396 (1962)
(plaintiffrecovers for fully performed divisible portion); Chaude v. Shepard, 122 N.Y. 397,
401..()2, 25 N .E. 358, 360 (1890) (recovery based on distinction between payments to ensure
performance and payments on the contract).
117. 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 267 (1824).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 268.
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voluntarily breaks it . . . should be permitted to make that very
engagement the foundation of a claim to compensation for services
under it."120 Emphasizing its moral outrage with the plaintiff's
actions,121 the court failed to distinguish between a suit on the
contract and a suit in quasi-contract based on the concept of unjust
enrichment. 122
Several courts have qualified the rule in Stark by attempting to
distinguish between a defaulting plaintiff who willfully breaches
without excuse and one whose breach is non-willful. 123 Such
distinctions are often difficult to make, however, and frequently
amount to little more than a particular appellate court's subjective
intuition.124 In continuing to deny defaulting plaintiffs recovery, other
courts have not cited the plaintiff's moral fault but have reasoned that
the benefit conferred on the defendant did not exceed the harm caused
by the breach.125 The computation of net gain or loss when the
plaintiff has defaulted, however, sometimes owes more to plaintiff's
status as a legal "sinner" than to the rules of mathematics. 126
A long line of authority rejects the rule of Stark. In Britton v.
Turner, 127 on facts almost identical to those in Stark, a defaulting
plaintiff gained recovery in quasi-contract despite his acknowledged
default. 128 'Focusing on the unjust enrichment accruing to a defendant
who receives a net gain,129 'the court discounted the rationale in Stark
as "technical reasoning" that obscured the central issue= the defendant
received beneficial services but paid no compensation. 130 More recent
cases adopting the Britton rule have added little by way of further
analysis; most cases emphasize the defendant's unjust enrichment in
granting recovery despite the plaintiff's status as a defaulting party. 131
120. Id. at 271.
121. See id. at 275 ("the laborer is worthy of his hire, only upon the performance of his
contract, and as the reward of his fidelity").
122. See id. at 272-73. See also Lee, supra note 113, at 1024.
123. See Harris v. The Cecil N. Bean, 197 F.2d 919, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1952); Begovich v.
Murphy, 359 Mich.156, 159,101 N.W. 2d 278,280 (1960); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS§
357(1932).
124. See 5 A. CoRBIN, supra note 40, § 1123.
125. See Kitchin v. Mori, 84 Nev. 181, 183·84, 437 P.2d 865, 866 (1968); Dluge v.
Whiteson, 292 Pa. 334, 335-36, 141 A. 230, 231 (1928).
126. See Newcombv. Ray, 99 N.H. 463,467-68, 114 A.2d 882,884-85 (1955).
127. 6N.H.481 (1834).
128. Id. at 482, 485-86. In Britton the plaintiff, who had contracted with the defendant to perform services, left the defendant's service before the contract was fully performed and without the defendant's consent. Id. at 482. Plaintiff sued, asking to be com·
pensated in quantum meruit for services performed. I d.
129. Id. at 487.
130. Id. at 493.
131. See, e.g., Caplan v. Schroeder, 56 Cal. 2d 515, 518-21, 364 P.2d 321, 324, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 145, 148 (1961); Loeffler v. Wilcox, 132 Colo. 449, 453, 289 P.2d 902, 904 (1955);
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THE PLU8-MINUS FACTOR

Keener and Woodward maintain that the plaintiff must prove both
that the defendant has committed a wrong and that the defendant has
benefitted at the expense of the plaintiff: "the facts must show not
only a plus, but a minus quality." 132 Since the idea that the defendant
should not be entitled to retain a .benefit wrongfully obtained at
plaintiff's expense partially underlies quasi-contract, the KeenerWoodward view makes some sense. If the defendant's gain cannot be
shown to have caused plaintiff a loss, no basis exists for permitting
recovery in quasi-contract.
Despite the Keener-Woodward conclusion that quasi-contractual
recovery on such facts would not be appropriate, the law today is
otherwise. The Restatement of Restitution, for example, intimates that
plaintiff's recovery in quasi-contract does not require a showing that
plaintiff's loss corresponds precisely to defendant's gain.133 The
Washington Supreme Court embraced this view in Olwell u. Nye &
Nissen Co. 134 'The defendant had used the plaintiff's washing machine
on an average of one day per week over a three year period.135 The
plaintiff, who had placed the machine in storage, not intending to use
it, brought an action in quasi-contract to recover the reasonable value
of the machine's use. Although the machine was valued at only $600,
the plaintiff recovered judgment in the trial court for more than
$1500.136 '. The court measured the plaintiff's recovery by the
defendant's "negative unjust enrichment," the amount defendant saved
in wages paid by using the machine. The defendant argued that the
plaintiff suffered no loss since he had not intended to use the
machine. 137 'Although the court did assert that a loss must be shown as
a condition to recovery, 138 ' it defined loss so flexibly that the case
stands for the proposition that plaintiff need suffer no demonstrable
loss in order to recover in quasi-contract. 139 Other courts also have
Peters v. Halligan, 182 Neb. 51, 60,152 N.W.2d 103,109 (1967); Burke v. McKee, 304 P.2d
307, 308-09 (Okla. 1956).
132. W. KEENER, supra note 6, at 163; F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 274, at
442. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 70, at 419; York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 449, 504 (1957).
133. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Introductory Note§§ 150·59, at 595·96 (1937).
134. 26 Wash.2d282, 173 P.2d652 (1946).
135. I d. at 283·84, 173 P .2d at 652-53.
136. See id. at 287-88, 173 P .2d at 654-55. The appellate court reduced the amount of the
judgment, not because it objected to the amount, but because the amount exceeded the
sum plaintiff asked for in his complaint. I d.
137. I d. at 285·86, 173 P .2d at 653-54.
138. Id.
139. See D. DoBBS, supra note 70, at 418.
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rejected the notion that plaintiff's loss must be matched against a
corresponding gain by defendant before an action in quasi-contract will
lie.140
The rejection of the Keener-Woodward plus-minus limitation has
increased the yardsticks available to measure damage awards in unjust
enrichment actions. As long as a plaintiff's recovery in quasi-contract
could not exceed his loss, the range of alternatives available to a court
in framing a damage award was limited; that standard effectively denies
judges the right to measure plaintiff's recovery by defendant's profits,
since the necessary link between defendant's profits and plaintiff's loss
does not exist. 141 Once a plaintiff's recovery can exceed the amount of
his loss, courts become free to apply a variety of tests in the calculation
of recovery. The case of Olwell v. Nye and Nissen Co. 142 provides a
useful illustration. If the court had felt bound strictly by the
Keener-Woodward plus-minus limitation, the plaintiff's recovery
probably would not have been measured by the defendant's negative
unjust enrichment. 143 By abandoning the narrow limitation, the court
in Olwell had a much 'vider range of alternatives available to assess
plaintiff's award. Instead of granting plaintiff the net profits that the
defendant earned by using the machine, the court properly could have
measured recovery by looking to the expenses saved as measured by the
rental value of the machine rather than by wages saved or by awarding
plaintiff the fair market value of the machine.
The decline of the Keener-Woodward plus-minus limitation illustrates
the general tendency of courts to breach the doctrinal barriers that have
been constructed to restrict recovery in quasi-contract. As courts have
stretched the concept of benefit itself to apply quasi-contract principles
to cases in which a particular result seemed just, they also have rejected
the plus-minus distinction where its application would restrict recovery
unjustly. In sweeping aside the artificial restraints of the plus-minus
formula, however, the courts have eliminated almost all limitations on
the calculation of damage awards in quasi-contract actions. The field
appears open to wide-ranging judicial subjectivity in measuring a
plaintiff's proper recovery. Since no firmly fixed standards guide either
the definition of benefit or application of the plus-minus formula, the

140. See, e.g., Catts v. Phalen, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 376, 381·82 (1844); Federal Sugar
Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., 268 F. 575, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1920);
Ablah v. Eyman, 188 Kan. 665, 677·80, 365 P.2d 181, 190·92 (1961).
141. See F. WOODWARD, supra note 14, § 274, at 442.
142. 26Wash.2d282, 173P.2d652 (1946).
143. Cf. D. DoBBS, supra note 70, at 418 (under Keener-Woodward analysis recovery
limited to value of converted goods; no consideration of defendant's profits).
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risks of injustice and unpredictability are great. 144 A meaningful
attempt to reconcile and unify the law of quasi-contract must be
grounded in concepts more legitimate and less artificial than the
Keener-Woodward view that an action in quasi-contract will not lie
unless an equivalent gain and loss are shown.

CoNCLUSION

No single comprehensive definition of benefit in quasi-contract is
possible. However convenient a uniform definition might be, a fair
reading of the cases that invoke quasi-contract principles shows that too
few consistent conceptual threads exist to fashion a unifying definition.
Several factors account for this conceptual discord. The divergent
factual settings in which quasi-contract principles are invoked stretch
across an extraordinarily broad range of legal categories. Actions
grounded in quasi-contract serve as alternatives to proceedings in both
tort and contract. In the contract category alone, quasi-contract
principles may be utilized in cases having their origin in express
contract and also in actions where no explicit consensual agreement
between the parties exists.
The varying attitudes of courts toward the idea of quasi-contract also
complicates analysis. Some jurisdictions have embraced the principles
underlying quasi-contract with genuine enthusiasm; others have shown
hostility to application of a doctrine that sometimes violates the logical
symmetry of more conventional legal rules. Inconsistencies also arise
from variations in judicial attitudes toward plaintiffs. A court that
perceives the plaintiff as a wrongdoer may deny recovery, even though
the defendant has reaped an unjustified gain at plaintiff's expense.
After determining that the defendant has benefitted and the plaintiff is
without legal "sin," courts still confront the difficult task of measuring
the defendant's gain. This tangled judicial environment produces a
paradoxical treatment of the concept of benefit. Although that concept
relates to the particular facts of the case in which it is being applied,
courts often express the concept of benefit so generally that the
definition becomes essentially meaningless as precedent.
Impatient to reconcile or at least to explain seeming inconsistencies
in conflicting cases, legal scholars tend to be uncomfortable with the

144. Cf. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 IIARv. L. REv. 457 (1897) (predictability is central to a rational legal system).
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conceptual disorders inherent in quasi-contract. In the field of
quasi-contract, theories have been advanced that actions arising in a
contractual context should be distinguished from other applications of
the doctrine. Such segmentation permits the development of generaliza·
tions that are reasonably accurate within their self-defined limits but
that do not apply across the whole range of quasi-contract actions;
these generalizations are useful only in the sense that they illuminate
the inherent haziness of quasi-contract principles.
Quasi-contract owes its origin to the persistent desire to do justice; it
saves a deserving plaintiff's claim from failure under conventional
legal principles. Resort to quasi-contractual concepts often reflects a
failure of such conventional principles to serve the ends of justice. The
perception of what is just is by no means an objective vision and varies
from generation to generation, from case to case, and from court to
court. In fulfilling this ubiquitous impulse to do justice where legal
logic has failed, quasi-contract has presented extraordinary difficulties
to those who have sought to systematize and reconcile the distinctly
unsystematic and conflicting cases that constitute the law of quasi·
contract. The doctrine, in both its origin and its application, has proved
itself immune to such attempts at organization.

